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Abstract
This paper discuss some of soft modelling used by decision maker to build Decision Support Systems 
Generator, such as mathematical or equadonal model, process model, formulae function etc. 
Mathematical model used in optimization, what-if, and goal-seeking mode. A process or functional 
model is used in the form of formal procedure to model human sense, perception and emotion.
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1.0 Introduction
In modelling, people aim to produce a suitable, correct, complete and consistent representation of a 
real world, or a selected part of the real world- They need this representation in a manageable 
notation. The notation should fulfil many criteria such as communicating clearly, seeming simple, 
relevant and useful yet precise, processable and printable. The entire complexity of the real world can 
hardly be expressed in this way. So modelling language must itself have rules about representations, 
resulting in restrictions being imposed on the models created. The process of transforming from the 
informal thoughts, words and actions of the real world to a formal form with restricted representation 
may prevent accuracy and completeness.
Modelling is not merely representation of a situation but it also attempts to capture the value 
judgements and their relative importance to the problem owner. Value judgement means that a 
person or group of persons may agree on the modelling concept in a certain situation but not 
necessarily agree with all the judgements. Models of situations are normally generated through the 
interaction of decision-makers and the problem. A model can be in a form that most people might 
understand such as picture, diagram etc or it may be in the form which can only be understood by a 
certain group of people - such as a mathematical model.
In constructing a model, the human mind will involve itself in making mental models of the perceived 
objects and events in the ‘real’ world and abstractions of i t  In order to make sense of perceived 
objects, humans perform modelling to show the logic of perception. This mental model can be 
roughly described as a mental representation that has the same relational structure as the situation that 
is being described and then reason operates by manipulating this model. Usually a mental model 
offers only a very simplified version of the situation.
2.0 Types of Models
A model can take many forms. Some consider it as equations, others as processes, formulae, 
functions, components etc. The forms of model which are most popular in model management for 
the purpose of decision-making are equation models or mathematical and process models.
Mathematical or equation modelling is the prevalent method in mechanistic systems. Processes and 
behaviour are often featured as algebraic, geometrical, differential and integral formulations. But these 
mechanistic systems are unable to model human senses such as perceptions and emotions. This is 
because humanistic systems and behaviour are often clouded by uncertainty and fuzziness. 
Mathematical modeling offers little reward in understanding the intricate and often complex issues 
inherent in humanistic systems. Moreover, when the behaviour and cognitive processes to be
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measured are centred upon human judgement and emotions, quantification or mathematical modelling 
becomes incompatible.
Hie models in Decision Support System (DSS) as envisaged by Sprague (1982) are mostly of the 
equation type. A great number of so-called corporate models or financial models consist of 
definitional equations and behavioural equations (Geoffrion, 1987). Once the behavioural equations 
are estimated and empirically validated, one starts playing with the models, e.g, in an optimization 
mode, or in a what-if or goal-seeking mode. Econometric models also consist of equation models. 
Another category is fanned by optimization models based on linear, dynamic or stochastic 
programming. A first generation of so-called DSS generators focuses on equation models with (fata 
base and interactive facilities like data, model and text manipulation. However these models are only 
applicable under die assumption that the equations can be filled in and that they give a valid 
description of reality. A more conceptual model framework is put forward by Bonczek et al (1980) 
which brings Artificial Intelligence(AI) into DSS.
A process or functional model is in die form of formal procedures. We are also interested in the 
formal procedures because these procedures can have a great deal of influence on die behaviour of an 
organization; e.g, by means of die knowledge that is available in an organization. Sadi a knowledge 
can be incorporated in the heuristic decision rules used in the organization or in informal procedures 
referring to the expertise in an organization about certain problems. In &e process or rale-based 
models, one does not ay to summarise a process in equation form. Instead, one tries to describe die 
sequence of events in a system.
Process models differ from equation models. The main differences are: the way in which the 
interconnection between parts or equations are defined. In equation models variables are 
interdependent, specified by coefficients. In process models the dependent is sequentially specified. 
Process models generally give a description of the way the variable is determined.
The early stages of modelling were chmcterized by heavy use of linear and nonlinear equations, 
sometimes in huge sets of simultaneous equations. T hisb  known assfsymbotic model When the 
computer came, its importance to modelling was as a nwnber cruncher tor&aoe large amounts of dtfa 
to coefficient estimates for the equations, or as a computational engine for solving sets o f equations. 
Eventually the computer took on a subtly different role. Rith& tiian as devices to compute 
mathematical models, the computer program became the model . The computer variables become the 
symbols which were manipulated by program operators instead of ma«heiiislirH oy«ritori. As the 
computer become more available in its time-sharing mode, intencthw iMddSa^^tecoaie more 
feasible. Minicomputers and mainframes dedicated to online usage gehaMiybad librtrtSa of models 
which could be called to do a variety of analyses. Unfortunately, it was conaaon-forthfe models to be 
stand-alone programmes with different data requirements and formats add little if  aiaylinkagfetietween 
the models.
3.0 Model Complexity Unfolding
In decision-making we identified the decision-maker as our primary target; let us examine conceptual 
modelling in relation to the decision-making process by unfolding its complexity We use a 
modelling method outlined by Checldand (1981) and Beer (1984), (Diapam in figure 4.3 below 
accounts for the situation).
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Figure 4.3 Decision-Making Elements
Where:
Model Name: DM:
Model Name: P 
Model Name: B 
Model Name: T 
Model Name: E
A model that is made up of factors for the decision-maker in making a 
decision.
A model that looks at the problem space.
A model that studies the behaviour of human decision-making.
A model that provides decision-maker with tools for decision making.
A model that itemises environmental factors to a decision-maker.
Now we will lode at the above situation in a bit more detail. We will respectively consider Aw 
decision-maker and factors surrounding him as a system model. In doing that we will further unfold 
the complexity of each model. Here we consider a system or model as a component as well as a 
function. We can draw out the conceptual model in its complexity as in figures-4.4 to 4.8.
The following are logical presentations of models and submodel name.
DM « ( P, B, T, E )
Where:
P ■ Problem faced by decision-maker,
B * Decision-maker’s behavioural styles,
T ■ Tools available to decision-maker,
E * An environment that may affect decision-making.
Each element in the model may again consist of another level of models:
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Problem
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Environment
Organization
Level 1
Level 2
Figure 4.5 Environmental Model
-------- • ■ .............................  ...............=
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Decision Tools
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
Level 5
Figure 4.6 Tool Model
Decision Maker
Level 1
Level 2
Figure 4.7 Decision-Maker Behaviour Model
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4 .0  Regulatory System Model
A regulatory system centred on the decision-maker can be constructed, based on factors affecting his 
decision. This can be seen as in the model shown in figure 4.8. It consists of a low variety bloc 
which is the decision-maker and a high variety bloc which is made up of certain elements for decision­
making such as the problem, decision-maker behaviour, decision tools and environment. The 
decision-maker interacts with the high variety bloc through some form of filter. This can be in the 
form of an attenuator or amplifier, whereas a result of this interaction will produce a certain model 
needed by the decision-maker for solving any problem that arises.
Amplifier
Filter
Figure 4.8 Regulatory System Model for Decision-Maker
In the initial stage of modelling, the problem may be quite complex. But then it is simplified to 
those elements of the model that seem relevant to the decision. Any krelevant elements will be 
removed, which reduces the model size and complexity. All that is left are elements involving 
decision views which might solve the problem. Sometimes an element which seems irrelevant now 
may prove differently at another time. It is in this way that new iotighU are generated about the 
problem, and creative thinking is simulated. By doing this, modelling seems quite helpful to the 
decision-maker to achieve an important objective • that is, to construct a hew reality from die existing 
reality. When the model form and content have been revised to the point that there is no new element 
added to the model, then the model is in its complete form. As this point is achieved, the decision­
maker will have an idea (or know) what step to do next, even if it is just to gather additional 
information to resolve any remaining uncertainties.
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Task/Problem
Difficulty
structured Complexity
Uncertainty
semistructured Importance
unstructured
Newness
Decision process
Figure 4.9 Overall Complexity Unfolding
In this work, after looking at various elements in decision-making, we come up with a general model 
representing the decision-maker situation in equilibrium.
5 .0 Human Judgement and Prediction
Managers being Human are disposed to limited information processing capacity, and are subject to 
judgemental biases and inferential shortcomings. Slovk, Fischhoff ft Lichenstein (1977), in an 
annual review on behavioural decision theory, describe several instances of human deviations from 
what is regarded as normative behaviour. Some of the more relevant weaknesses in human judgement 
are:
(i). Conservatism : The tendency, integrating probabilistic information, to produce 
posterior probability nearer to the prior probability.
(ii). Cascaded Inference (Schum in Wallsten, 1980): real life problems often have several 
stages, with inferences at each stage relying on data which are themselves infened from 
unreliable observations or reports. Subject posterior probabilities are more extreme than 
those prescribed by the model.
(iii). Heuristics and Biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974): people systematically violate 
the principles of rational decision-making when judging probabilities, making predictions 
or otherwise attempting to cope with probabilistic tasks. Representativeness, 
availability, and anchoring are three judgemental heuristics often used. Although they 
are often efficient, they oan lead to biases that are large, persistent, and serious in their 
implications, fc? •.'•c.dsion-makers. A better understanding of these heuristics and of the
_______bt*ssi r:ou.ii improve judgement and decision in situations of uncertainty. ______
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(iv). Choice subjects use rales and strategies en route to a decision, such as conjunctive, 
disjunctive, compensatory rule, and principle of dominance. In general, people appear to 
prefer strategies that are easy to justify md do not involve reliance on relative weights, 
trade-offs functions, or other numerical computations.
The tone of their summary shows that people's judgements are subject to systematic biases of limited 
information-processing capacity and ignorance of the rules for optimal information-processing and 
decision-making. Nisbett & Ross (1980) reveal human inferential shortcomings are due to two 
tendencies, namely: the ovenitilisation of certain generally valid intuitive, inferential strategies; nd 
the underutilisation of certain formal, logical, and statistical strategies.
The intuitive strategies include the application of pre-existing knowledge structure- schemas, beliefs, 
and theories; and the utilisation of the representativeness and availability of heuristics. The formal 
strategies including characterisation of events, sample and population; assessments of covariation, 
causal analysis, prediction, and theory testing often used by scientists.
A decision of litde consequence generally will be guided by intuitive strategies. At the other 
extreme, recurrent decisions with important consequences generally should be made with die aid of die 
best normative strategies available, even if these are relatively costly.
Hogarth’s (1981) research on judgemental evaluation and prediction, and Jacob et al (1989) on human 
capabilities, produced at least two firm conclusions:
(i). people have limited information-processing capacity, and
(ii). they are adaptive.
The consequences of limited human information capacity have bearings on human attributes:
(i). Perception of information is not comprehensive but selective
(ii). Attention span is limited.
(iii). The nature of the processing is mainlydooe m a sequential manner.
(iv). Processing capacity: people do not possess intuitive calculators which allow them to 
nake what one might call optimal calculations. Rather, they use fairly simple 
procedures, rales or tricks in older to reduoe mental effort They i t  also unable to 
process large volumes of information and so may ignore some important information.
(iv) People have limited memory capacity. They cannot store all the information pertinent to 
a problem domain. Memory also contains past experience which cannot be accessed 
during the required time, or it may have been distorted or simply forgotten.
In reality, human activity systems are capable of rapid response to changing circumstances. People 
can and do respond to the challenge of the new. They have a high capacity for learning new skills and 
also they can develop informal systems.
6.0 Conclusion
Soft modelling is normally used by decision maker in making a decision, especially in building the 
DSS generator. What the decision maker has to do is by first infolding the model complexity. This 
include unfolding problem faced by decision maker, unfolding decision maker’s behavioural styles, tool 
available to the decision maker, and an environment that may affect decision making. Once the model 
complexity was unfolded, a regulatory system model is created which is centred on the decision maker 
which also include human judgement and prediction.
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